IN the wake of last week’s release of much of the evidence against Bruce Ivins, critics are calling for the disclosure of some key scientific work on the murder weapon – anthrax strain RMR-1029 – to resolve lingering doubts. But the feds have good reason to be cautious about that – and they have an alternative for disclosure that will be a big help in the meantime.
The genetic assay that ID’d the Ivins-developed strain as what killed five people and injured others was only one of two remarkable technical feats that the investigators pulled off. The other one was tracking down the “delivery device” – the envelopes the killer used.
The scientific work on the virus samples was a breakthrough, and I can certainly see reason for an outside check on its accuracy. But we are talking about a weapon of mass destruction here; it’s easy to see why the feds are leery about releasing anything like a “blueprint.”
After all, a core irony of the case is that a government researcher used government property and a government-developed super-deadly bacterium to kill five innocent Americans. Indeed, Maureen Stevens, the widow of one victim, is suing the government for allegedly lax security procedures that let Ivins kill her husband.
So, while I agree with those (like my colleagues at The Post’s Newscorp sister paper, The Wall Street Journal) that some independent check of the genetic work on the killer strain is in order, I believe it’s going to take quite some time to get it done safely.
And, in the meantime, the FBI can answer its critics by releasing some much less problematic research – the work on the envelopes.
As someone who got “thraxed” (and thus got to listen in-person last week as the investigators presented their evidence) and who works in print, I find this part of the investigation almost as neat as the genetic work.
The spores were mailed in envelopes sold at US post offices – from a press run of about 500,000. But no commercial print run produces perfectly identical copies – the ink is heavier in certain spots than others at different points of the run; there can be tiny “cracks” or splatters and other marks (called “print defects”) that, under careful investigation, allow you to ID certain copies as being from a particular part of the run.
The feds did another full press run for the envelopes. Using samples of the ones that had been distributed in the attack (but gathered up afterward), plus shipping records and intensive examination of the recovered anthrax letters, the investigative team was eventually able to determine that the deadly envelopes came from one narrow range of the press run – envelopes that were only shipped to three post offices in the Frederick, Md., area.
At one of which, Bruce Ivins maintained a PO box.
This was first-rate investigative work – but making every detail of it public poses no real threat. (Yes, it might reveal a technique that cops would rather keep confidential, for future use – but there’s no “WMD blueprints” issue here.)
Even without the genetic evidence, the envelopes – plus other stuff, like the documented fact that Ivins put in unprecedented and unaccounted-for late-night hours alone in his “hot” lab in the runup to both anthrax mailings – should have been enough to convict. And it makes it an even better bet that the genetic work will hold up to scrutiny.
Bottom line: While the slow wheels of the bureaucracy grind their way toward permitting an outside check of the genetic evidence, the feds should answer their critics by making public some of their other breakthrough on the case.
Mark Cunningham is The Post’s op-ed editor.