A month ago, Iran’s “Supreme Guide” Khamenei demanded that last Friday’s presidential election be transformed into an “epic” endorsement of his regime, appealing for a record turnout and a clear winner with a massive majority. He didn’t endorse, but most assumed he wanted one of his two minions, Ali Akbar Velayati or Saeed Jalili, to win.
Khamenei got none of what he wanted. The turnout was the second lowest of the 11 presidential elections since 1979, with more than 6 million fewer votes cast than in 2009.
And the victor, Hassan Rouhani, wasn’t one of Khamenei’s favorites (who came third and fifth among six candidates), nor did he win a massive majority. He drew slightly more than 50 percent, the lowest ever. (The average for past presidential winners is 70 percent.)
Of course, Rouhani is not exactly an outsider. Yes, the media have dubbed him a “reformist” and a “moderate” — but he hasn’t offered a single proposal for reforming anything. And his record, mostly with the security services, reveals him as anything but a moderate, especially when it comes to the brutal suppression of dissent.
Rouhani has conjured up his persona in the manner that a novelist creates a character. His names included “Fereydoun” and “Sorkheh,” until 1978, when the mullahs rose against the shah as he was studying textile design in a technical college in Glasgow. He instantly changed course and became a law student in Caledonian University in the same city — then changed his name to develop an Islamic persona.
“Fereydoun” recalls a mythical, pre-Islamic Iranian king who captured the Arab “monster” Zahhak and imprisoned him in Mount Damavand. Rouhani changed that to Hassan, the name of the Prophet’s eldest grandson. He also dropped the word Sorkheh from his family name to become Hassan Rouhani. Meaning both “spiritual” and “clerical,” the word “Rouhani” is well fitted for a career in a theocratic system.
Back in Iran, the newly minted Hassan Rouhani shed the suit and tie worn by most Iranian men for a mullah’s Arab-style attire; he grew an impressive beard and donned a white turban. (The white denotes his Iranian descent; mullahs claiming Arab descent wear black turbans.) By 1981, he’d also acquired the title of Haji, having made the pilgrimage to Mecca. And he joined the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which quickly emerged as the regime’s Praetorian Guard.
By the mid-1980s, he’d become a mid-ranking official of multiple facets. In intellectual circles, he used the title “Doctor” and boasted of academic achievements in Scotland. In religious circles, he used the title Hojat al-Islam (The Proof of Islam), designating him as a mid-level mullah. In military circles, he was a “sardar” (headman), the equivalent of a colonel. For years he ran Khatam al-Anbia Holdings, the Guard’s biggest conglomerate. In a regime that is a sucker for titles, he had it all.
Over the years, the strategy proved effective. Rouhani is one of the very few who’ve managed to maintain their positions inside or on the margin of Tehran’s complex power structure for almost three decades, surfing over bitter factional feuds that wrecked the careers of more prominent figures.
In a regime that is a synthesis of the mullahs, the military and the security services, Rouhani is the living example of the pawn to field when the system is in a tight corner.
And the Khomeinist system is in a tight corner now. In the televised presidential debates, all the candidates agreed that Iran is in “a major crisis,” with UN, US and EU sanctions hurting the people.
Rouhani might now enable the regime to buy more time through a simulacrum of negotiations with the outside world, perhaps even obtaining the easing of some sanctions. In his memoirs, Rouhani depicts how he duped European foreign ministers, including Britain’s Jack Straw and France’s Dominique de Villepin, with a mixture of promises and cosmetic adjustments to Iran’s nuclear project.
He describes the United States as the global “village headman” with whom Tehran must seek a deal — and asserts his hatred of America as “an arrogant power” that must be fought and defeated wherever possible.
Though Khamenei calls the shots in Tehran, a strong personality could use presidential power to impose his own imprint. But I believe Rouhani is too much of a careerist to challenge the “Supreme Guide.” Rouhani’s model and mentor is Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former president nicknamed “the man for all seasons,” who has swallowed all manner of injuries to remain on the margins of power.
The new president is bound to clash with Khamenei — but most likely to wind up retreating with his tail between his legs.
In that sense, Khamenei has got the president he wanted.