Israel and the US must face the future of the war against Hamas

As Israel pulls some troops from Gaza and focuses on its key battles in Khan Younis in the south — where it is seeking to destroy Hamas’ power structure and kill the monstrous leaders of its terror cadres — it’s clear that its justified and humane war against the Strip’s genocidaires is entering a new phase. 

This does not represent, in any way, an admission of defeat or mission failure by Israel. Hamas must be destroyed by any means necessary, and the IDF is still clearly committed to that end. 

Yet the exigencies of war must be acknowledged. This will be a long battle, and must be fought as much with intelligence as with overwhelming force.

Hence the drawdown, and hence too Israel’s easing of the Gaza naval blockade for the first time since 2007: Now that Hamas’ capacity has been severely degraded, a humanitarian re-opening of the sea is possible. 

It does, however, raise a significant question. 

Who will administer Gaza once Israel’s mission is complete?

For administered it must be — and administered without corruption or the creation of operational space for terrorists, until the people of Gaza are ready to reject violence. 

The United Nations can’t be trusted with doing so; its agencies have allowed Hamas terror to fester for decades, when not actively helping the murderous group. (UNWRA, the UN Works and Relief Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East, is utterly controlled by Hamas and allied extremists.)

The Palestinian Authority is out of the question; Israel itself also faces major strategic obstacles in becoming such an administrator.  

The other burning issue here, of course, is the open question of an open war with Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The recent and laudable killing of Hamas No. 2 Saleh al-Arouri by a Beirut drone strike, widely believed to be Israel’s handiwork, represents a major tactical and strategic gain for the Jewish state — to say nothing of sending a clear message to other Hamas bigwigs abroad: Your days are numbered. 

Israel was careful to signal publicly that it does not want a wider war with Hezbollah, with a government spokesman saying of the strike: “Whoever did this has a gripe with Hamas.”

But that may not matter in the long run. 

Hezbollah will, even now, be calculating whether it can afford to increase its already aggressive cross-border attacks. 

Israel, meanwhile, has signaled that it will no longer tolerate Hezbollah’s militarization of Lebanon south of the Litani River, in defiance of the 2006 UN Resolution 1701 that ended the last Israeli-Lebanon war. (UNIFIL, the UN force in the area charged with enforcing that resolution, instead does nothing.)

The Iranian-backed terror group has been shooting missiles and rockets from the area ever since Oct. 7, forcing the evacuation of roughly 60,000 civilians from northern Israel, where entire towns have been destroyed.

Jerusalem hopes diplomacy can resolve that crisis, but may have to use force in self-defense.

Iran and its proxies have chaos on the rise across the region, and between Tehran’s ambitions and President Biden’s hesitancy, there’s no reason to think that’ll stop with the end of active combat in Gaza.